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“Nature in a Box:
Ecocriticism, Goethe’s Ironic Werther, and Unbalanced Nature”
Heather I. Sullivan, Trinity University
Ecocriticism emphasizes how our bodily and ecological boundaries are just as
porous, inter-penetrable, and open as are our cultural and linguistic realms. As individual
bodies and communities, we are fully immersed in our material environment and
participating in constant exchanges of matter and energy. Highlighting open boundaries
and the material flows in which we participate contests the subject-based assertions that
we are primarily self-enclosed, self-determining individuals whose external surroundings
are relatively insignificant compared to our deep, inner worlds. The notion of a closed
subject assumes that bodily boundaries are only intentionally penetrable, thereby
overlooking the many substances such as air, water, food, but also toxic materials that
regularly, if not continuously, enter and exit our bodies. In this essay, I nevertheless
advocate for a cautious approach to the ecocritical question of boundaries. This approach
acknowledges the ongoing transformations and exchanges of matter and energy through all
bodies, environments, and ecosystems, yet it also attests to the obvious fact that
boundaries, in some form, are requisite for organic life as we know it.1 In conjunction with
Stacy Alaimo’s notion of “transcorporeality” such that bodies, matter, and cultures are all
part of the material entanglements that co-emerge, and, in Karen Barad’s phrase, that
“intra-act” as relations preceding relata, I therefore propose another approach when
viewing the question of material bodies, minds, and their environments. That is, we
individuals are neither fully bounded, self-determining subjects, nor are we fully open,
“vibrant bodies pulsing in harmony with their environments,” as Louise Westling claims
(36). Instead, bodies, like our subjectivities, are necessarily in disharmony with their
environments, existing as complex nexuses of shifting, intra-acting membranes that
1

Additionally, the quest for the eradicating boundaries echoes aspects of the political and economic call for
“the free and open markets” associated with capitalistic globalization. Indeed, Vandana Shiva and other
international scholars have made that claim regarding the “opening” of new markets worldwide as well as the
genetic engineering across species. Shiva writes in Stolen Harvest: “Do the boundaries between species have
integrity? Or are these boundaries mere constructs that should be broken for human convenience? The call to
‘transgress boundaries’ advocated by both patriarchal capitalists and postmodern feminists cannot be so simple. It
needs to be based on a sophisticated and complex discrimination between different kinds of boundaries, an
understanding of whom is protected by what boundaries and whose freedom is achieved by what transgressions”
(Shiva, 57). See also Patrick Murphy’s discussion of international and ecological “borders” in Ecocritical
Explorations.
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maintain temperature and chemical differences as well as some kind of bodily form
requisite for individual living beings. Yet, at the same time, bodies and minds exist only in
relation to their species and co-species, other life forms, and their materiality. Furthermore,
boundaries are not always where one expects them, and our subjective, cultural, and
political assumptions regarding the limits of our physical and mental selves are highly
contested. An ecologically-informed perspective for ecocriticism hence should strive to
maintain simultaneously a sense of open and closed boundaries and re-conceptualize them
as part of dynamic, evolving, and very “unbalanced nature.” This essay applies such a
perspective to Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s “ironic Werther,” who emerges from the
juxtaposition of Goethe’s boundary-busting nature novel Werther with his satirical comedy
thereof, The Triumph of Sentimentality. The protagonist in Triumph seeks containment of
nature in a box, whereas Werther longs to erase all bounds and be immersed in nature,
even to “be nature” as a bug. I then relate the ironic Werther to Timothy Morton’s
celebration of “radical openness” in The Ecological Thought in order to assess the
advantages of maintaining some boundaries in our ecocritical wanderings.
Rethinking boundaries brings an awareness that nature’s borders are in flux, even
though specific life forms do exist in specific ecological niches. A long-term and broad view
of the biosphere through eons of time demonstrates that nature is not a static place in
contrast to the radical changes and “progress” of human culture. Rather, balance is an issue
of scale. In fact, there is an increased ecological emphasis on “unbalanced nature” that
replaces outdated notions of nature’s holistic stability, as John Kricher describes in The
Balance of Nature: Ecology’s Enduring Myth. Kricher debunks the long-held values of
balanced nature, stasis, and climax states: “The balance of nature paradigm is of little value
within evolution and ecology. It has never been clearly defined and is basically misleading.
But the balance of nature is esthetically pleasing, a fact that is largely responsible for its
continued vigor through the ages” (Kricher 23). Furthermore, Kricher notes that the
balance of nature is a teleological belief system wherein all parts fit neatly together in their
place as if by design. This belief system is not scientific, though it has long been included in
ecological theories and its siren call still reverberates in many environmental discussions.
It is a challenge not to see the tremendous beauty and seeming longevity of natural
landscapes as sites of harmony and stability in contrast to radical and rapid human changes.
2

Yet even though the anthropogenic devastation of so many ecosystems is taking place at an
unprecedented pace, that does not mean that nature has only recently, and only because of
us, become unbalanced. The particular form of these changes is different, but not the
imbalance.
The necessity of rejecting the reigning notion of balanced nature has been noted in
ecocriticism, particularly by the ecocritics Ursula Heise in Sense of Place, Sense of Planet,
Greg Garrard in Ecocriticism, and Dana Phillips in The Truth of Ecology. All three cite the
ecologist Daniel Botkin’s 1990 Discordant Harmonies, which, like Kricher’s more recent
work, describes the prevalent yet fallacious belief in balanced nature as a utopian
continuity. Heise quickly dispatches with the notion of “global ecology as harmonious,
balanced, and self-regenerating,” notes Botkin’s rejection of orderly, steady-state ecological
systems, and declares that this has “momentous consequences for environmental literature
and ecocriticism” (Heise 64, 65). Garrard discusses the image of stable, enduring nature as
a fall-back to pastoral visions that resonate in the outmoded ideas of succession and climax
states. Phillips writes that:
ecology has come to be identified in the popular mind with such values as balance, harmony, unity,
purity, health, and economy. It’s fair to say that many people regard these values, however utopian
they may be, as all but indisputable and as all but synonymous with the very word ‘ecology.’ Few
laypersons dare to question these values publicly, and imagery expressing our collective devotion to
them, and indeed to everything green, pervades our daily lives. (Phillips 42)

Yet if we reject the tidy contrast between the pastoral images of harmoniously stable
nature existing in opposition to frenetically “developing/progressing” humanity, if we
begin, in other words, with nature that has been unbalanced all along, then we face a
considerable challenge: how do we address our radical alterations to environments
without longing for a stability to which we might “return”? How do we also counter the
claims that our disruptions are therefore irrelevant or merely part of larger patterns of
change? Formulating ecological strategies based on unbalanced nature alters our
fundamental understanding of environmental questions; it shifts the ground, and
destabilizes our green agendas for balance with nature. It is nevertheless necessary to
avoid erroneous solutions. Unbalanced nature means long-term fluxes, ongoing formation
and destruction, and, as Kricher says, evolution and geological processes. He stresses that
3

nature is dynamic, not static, and boundaries are short-term: “If a habitat, any habitat, is
left alone, protected, with nothing done to it, it will nonetheless eventually exhibit change.
Change is inevitable because eventually some form of natural disturbance will occur,
climate may alter, new species will invade, extant species will drop out” (Kricher 91).
Nature’s dynamic forms still have, according to Kricher, species and habitats, hence some
boundaries, however temporary.
Negotiating amongst the cultural delineations and the ecological, or biological
boundaries of our material bodies as part of unbalanced nature is a tricky business, but one
literary model for envisioning this process is provided by the juxtaposition of Goethe’s
famously sentimental The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774) with his less well-known play
that satirizes Werther, Triumph of Sentimentality (1777). Indeed, I claim that one cannot
derive an accurate sense of how Goethe views “nature” without reading both texts together.
If Werther sings sentimental praises of nature much like a prototypical ecocritic desiring to
see nature, be nature, and to erase all boundaries, including those between bodies, nature’s
teeming life forms (especially insects), as well of as those dividing classes, lovers, and
bodies, then Prince Oronaro in Triumph seeks quite the opposite, which is to say he hopes
to keep nature under control and in a box. Oronaro loves nature, but finds it much too
fluctuating, unbalanced, and bug-ridden, so he refuses to go outside and revels instead in a
nature room safe within his castle. For travel, he has boxes to carry “nature” with him
everywhere. He also safely concentrates his love on a puppet girl whose body is literally
stuffed with sentimental literature thereby avoiding the greater bodily challenges of actual
intra-actions with natural and feminine bodies. Werther, on the other hand, constantly
wanders outdoors through the elements, and pines for a real girl, Lotte. Overcome with
Storm and Stress sentimentality, he desires the opening of bodies and minds to each other,
until he finally chooses the radical solution of a suicidal shot to the head in a gesture that
unfortunately opens his mind once and for all to the world, and presumably, to nature. His
quest for boundless connection leads to fatal ruptures. His fellow nature worshipper,
Oronaro, chooses the opposite path and seeks instead containment strategies. Every
evening when travelling, he unpacks his beloved puppet along with his “nature in a box,”
creating a nature grotto in a designated room. Goethe’s Triumph derives its energy from
this problem of containment. This scene of boxes is paralleled by another enactment of
4

intense containment: the stand-alone monodrama in Act IV that mournfully stages the
sufferings of Prosperina trapped in the barren landscapes of hell, longing for escape and
some decent greenery and gardens. This is performed by the queen who has fallen for
Oronaro’s effusive sentimentality, much to her husband’s dismay. Triumph’s containment
of nature’s landscapes also contain and imprison the figures; this is in stark contrast to the
wild storms and flooding rivers that destroy landscape forms and embody openness in
Werther. Together the two Goethean texts provide us with ironic sentimentality about our
very real material entanglements in the world, and suggest that, if nothing else, there is
confusion with regard to “nature” about boundaries, where they are, who or what
determines them, and what happens when one believes whole-heartedly in one’s own
ability to create them or destroy them at whim.
It is obvious to point out that Goethe’s Werther is about nature, but it is only part of
the story. For one thing, reading Werther’s nature revelry ironically helps expose his
longing to be an insect, an overlooked yet significant issue. Additionally, the novel’s effusive
nature-fever is most often read alone, without reference to The Triumph of Sentimentality,
despite the fact that it is Goethe’s direct reflection on his world-famous best-seller.2 For our
question of boundaries, the juxtaposition of Werther and Triumph is the most productive
means for gaining understanding of Goethe’s views on nature, and his “ironic aesthetics,” as
Astrida Tantillo notes. She reads Werther alongside Triumph, and analyzes both of them as
a critique of Rousseauian nature worship. Tantillo’s description of the “ironic aesthetic”
who “refuses to allow a simple or unified interpretation of a work of art” is paradigmatic
for Goethe generally, and it is also relevant for ironic ecocritical readings of boundaries
(Tantillo, 2001, 453).3 She compares the ironic aesthetic (as one must be when reading the

2

Much of the scholarship on Goethe’s Werther overlooks the lesser-known satire, and thus reads the novel alone as
a monolithic assertion of modernity, sentimentality, the middle-class, or the relationship of nature to art. Most
readings also neglect the other texts Goethe wrote relating to Werther such as the “prequel” to the novel, Werther’s
Travels (mostly known as “Letters from Switzerland”), written later. Hans Rudolf Vaget discusses the many
Werther texts together, reading Werther as the “undead” that haunts Goethe throughout his life as a reflection of his
own uncontained creativity
3
Tantillo’s ironic approach to Goethe’s texts stands in contrast to more traditional readings that tend to interpret
Werther as an autobiographical extension of Goethe. Other authors who similarly emphasize the novel’s irony
include Duncan, Grathoff, Kuzniar, Lange, Leidner, Prier, and Sullivan; however these authors concentrate on the
novel’s internal irony rather than how it relates to Goethe’s satire of his own sentimentality. Tantillo’s 2001 essay
stresses the insights of this cross-fertilization, and her recent Goethe’s Modernisms demonstrates again the benefits
of multiple perspectives for reading Goethe.
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satire, Triumph) with the “sentimental aesthetic” like Werther and some ecocritics, who
demand a harmonious interpretation. In this essay, I use the ironic aesthetic’s insistence on
multiple views in order to uphold a perspective of open and closed boundaries in
ecocriticism. This view puts the two texts on a spectrum, so that we can see on the one end
the intense rhapsody and free-flowing immersion into the “all,” and on the other end, the
parody as a quest for containment and control with boxes.
Similarly, neither the issue of Goethe as Germany’s “nature poet” nor the issue of our
contested bodily, environmental, and subject boundaries can be limited to one end of the
spectrum or to a singular, static position.4 Goethe specifically stresses irony as inherently
necessary when seriously approaching nature. In his self-proclaimed scientific masterpiece,
Towards a Theory of Color, he declares that some irony is imperative to avoid abstraction
and uncontained theorizing that can blind us to our own assumptions.5 Goethe’s “irony” is
hence a form of self-awareness and an attempt to see beyond our own ideological, aesthetic,
and subjective frameworks; it is an openness to various viewpoints. For ecocriticism, such
irony with regard to boundaries is crucial in that we must simultaneously negotiate with
serious ecological limits (that are denied by current economic practices) and yet also our
own porosity and transcorporeality as bodies existing in open flows with our surroundings.
The challenges of calling for limits to our environmental impact while also asserting
limitless connections and inter- and intra-penetration requires careful consideration. At
the very least, ecocriticism would benefit from the recognition that boundaries, whether
contested, constructed, or life-containing, are, indeed, a vital issue.
For Werther, boundaries are the problem. He loves nature completely and without
irony; he savors it, sees it as a vast interconnected weave, and as an all-encompassing flow
in which he longs to dissolve. Despite the many readings of “nature” in Werther as an

4

As Goodbody notes, Goethe’s significance with regard to nature for German culture is equivalent to Thoreau’s in
American studies. Goodbody’s book on ecocriticism discusses 20th-century German literature, but includes a chapter
on Goethe as “ecophilosophical inspiration.”
5
Goethe strongly advocates against observations of nature that begin with a theory instead of with the observed
phenomenon; he suggests irony to avoid abstract theorizing. “Jedes Ansehen geht über in ein Betrachten, jedes
Betrachten in ein Sinnen, jedes Sinnen in ein Verknüpfen, und so kann man sagen, daß wir schon bei jedem
aufmerksamen Blick in die Welt theoretisieren. Dieses aber mit Bewußtsein, mit Selbstkenntnis, mit Freiheit, und
um uns eines gewagten Wortes zu bedienen, mit Ironie zu tun und vorzunehmen” provides the best possible results.
(Goethe, Theory of Color, 14).
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internal mirroring of the sentimental self, 6 I suggest following Goethe’s lifelong scientific
studies that attribute an intense “agency” and resonance to nature as something materially
present beyond the self. Nature is the active world of physical materiality in which Werther
exists, one in which the elements drive the flux and flow of weather and energy exchanges,
and one which forms him as much as he shapes it. Early on in the novel, this means an
inspired revelry: “This confirmed me in my resolution of adhering in the future entirely to
Nature. Nature alone is inexhaustible and can form the great artist” (Goethe, Werther 11).
Later, once he feels oppressed by cultural norms and Lotte’s marriage to Albert, Werther
again speaks of an overwhelmingly active nature, though now as a fearsome, destructive
force: “My heart is wasted by the thought of that destructive power which lies latent in
every part of universal Nature. Nature has formed nothing that does not destroy itself, and
everything near it. And so, surrounded by earth and air and all the active forces, I stagger
on in sheer anxiety” (Goethe, Werther, 37). Nature here is a power driving Werther
onwards and “forming” him. His final turn to suicide occurs in part because he cannot close
himself to outside influences, whether natural or cultural. He is wildly open to the world,
with disastrous results.
Werther’s openness is offset by the novel’s epistolary form, which is
uncharacteristically “closed”: it famously presents only Werther’s writings and thus stands
primarily as an extended monologue with only brief comments from the editor at the
beginning and a few notes and thoughts from others at the very end, after Werther has
decided for death. Yet his monomaniacal writing only serves to reveal even more his
absorption of energy and ideas that are all around him. The more singular his voice appears,
the more open he is to external influences, both physical and cultural. Indeed, what appears
to be his voice is often direct citation.7 His emotional connections to nature, children, and
farmers are well-documented examples of how prone he is to the impulses of others; I
highlight here instead his sympathy for, and desire to become, a bug. In his very first letter,
for example, he describes retreating from a certain “Leonore’s” affections, and proclaims a
desire to become a beetle (cockchafer), and then, as a bug, to “float about in this ocean of
6

Readings of Werther’s self tend to see nature in the novel primarily as a reflection of his internal events and
feelings, such that human subjectivity overwrites the outer world. Analyses concentrating on Werther’s self include
Furst, Muenzer, and Swales.
7
See Sullivan’s discussion.
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fragrance, and find in it all the food one needs” (Goethe, Werther 6). The vision of retreat
from social relationships into an insect world predates Kafka’s Metamorphosis, but one can
still see a similarity in terms of loss of personal agency and escape from social
responsibility. That Werther, as the middle-class man at the entrance to modernity, rejects
cultural restraints, economic divisions, and all other boundaries, yet derives his greatest
satisfaction from a bug-eye’s view is telling. Werther fails socially, and in his quest to find
harmony with nature, precisely because he expects in both cases to discover a deep,
harmonic convergence despite class differences, social conventions, or species delineations.
Seeking immersion into the minutiae of the insect world, Werther assumes that balanced
nature pulses in harmony with his thoughts and desires. Becoming a bug means, apparently,
achieving a cosmically creative unity, “Oh Wilhelm,” he cries, “how willingly would I have
given up my human existence to merge with the wind, or to embrace the torrent! Won’t this
imprisoned soul some day be released for such bliss?” (Goethe, Werther, 70).
Merging with the wind and insects is indeed the prototypical Wertherian quest. He
begins with the wish to immerse himself in nature as he lies next to the lovely stream,
seeking the insect’s view. “[W]hen I hear the humming of the little world among the stalks,
and am near the countless indescribable forms of the worms and insects, then I feel the
presence of the Almighty” (Goethe, Werther 6). His approach to nature is prescient for
much of early ecocriticism, which tends to follow in the romantics’ footsteps.8 Werther thus
not surprisingly rages when trees are indiscriminately chopped down, and he spends a
great deal of time hiking through the hills and dales thinking poetically. But it is not just
nature that moves him, it is also Love. Indeed, the novel follows a tragic love tale that
unfolds within various discussions of nature: Werther meets Lotte and loves her, and she
loves him; they share a love for sentimental nature poetry as well (“Klopstock!” ), yet she is
engaged to the hard-working and thoroughly bourgeois Albert. She marries Albert whereas
Werther seeks solace in work and the aristocracy. In dismay at the restrictive class
prejudices, he quickly turns back to his imagined harmony with nature. At this point,
though, nature becomes a horror of regurgitating self-destruction, since insect-nature has a
dark side: “The universe to me is an all-consuming, devouring monster” (Goethe, Werther
8

Werther’s participation in Germany’s Storm and Stress era is more broadly considered to be part of European
Romanticism.
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37). Even here, Werther maintains his preference for the insect-perspective by worrying
about how every step of a stroll through the woods kills hundreds of tiny bugs. “The most
innocent walk costs thousands of poor insects their lives; one step destroys the delicate
structures of the ant and turns a little world into chaos” (Goethe, Werther 37). Overcome
by the rather incompatible mix of the insect’s perspective, Messianic delusions , and a
burning passion for Lotte, Werther finally kills himself with a pistol shot to the head,
thereby attaining real openness to “nature.” He quite literally opens his mind and body to
the world. “When the surgeon arrived, Werther was lying on the floor; his pulse beat, but
his limbs were paralyzed. The bullet had entered the forehead over the right eye; his brains
were protruding. He was bled in the arm; the blood came, he was still breathing” (Goethe,
Werther 87). His death lasts twelve hours as he bleeds out, open to the world. This final
scene suggests that some boundaries can, in fact, be beneficial in the short term.
Much like Werther, Morton’s The Ecological Thought rejects all boundaries. Both
Werther and Morton celebrate openness, exploded bounds, and, finally, Love. Although
Morton’s book successfully shakes up many core ideas in environmental thinking by
questioning, for example, how “nature” is in many ways a capitalistic concept derived from
exploitation of resources and then imagining an idyllic realm of the past, he still sounds
much like Werther with his revolutionary cry to transgress all boundaries, calling for and
locating us in “radical openness.” Morton asks:
Is there such a thing as the environment? Is it everything ‘around’ us? At what point do we stop, if at
all, drawing the line between environment and non-environment: The atmosphere? Earth’s
gravitational field? Earth’s magnetic field, without which everything would be scorched by solar
winds? The sun, without which we wouldn’t be alive at all? The Galaxy? Does the environment
include or exclude us? Is it natural or artificial, or both? (Morton 10)

His point is well taken, in the sense that he clearly reveals the complexity of environmental
delineations. We are open systems, interacting with environments, all of which flow into
each other on a microscopic and cosmic scale. Furthermore, Morton shifts from the socalled “web” of ecology to the “mesh” of the universe, which “consists of infinite
connections and infinitesimal differences” (Morton, 30), and thereby brings ecology into
postmodernism. In enmeshing us, Morton demonstrates the significance of the question of
boundaries: “Although there is not absolute, definite ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of beings, we
9

cannot get along without these concepts either. The mesh is highly paradoxical.
Endosymbiosis abolishes inside-outside distinctions. A life form must have a boundary for
filtering nutrients and poisons. Yet these boundaries are not perfectly defined” (Morton 39).
He thus mentions that we need bodily bounds, at least to “filter nutrients and poisons,”
unlike Werther who finally attempts full immersion. But are bodies merely a filter? They
are also themselves ecosystems. After all, the E. coli in our intestines require the solidity of
the intestinal lining to maintain their preferred environment even as intestines must be
porous in order to allow nutrient absorption. Intestinal openings to the world for input and
output are quite specific, and all complex life depends on intestines remaining otherwise
resiliently resistant to too much openness. Morton notes the issue of filtering, but seems to
overlook the profound significance of the actual boundary. Ripping open intestines, for
example, opening them to the rest of the body, and especially the world, would have
disastrous effects on a body, and, at the very least, disconcerting effects on the E. coli. While
Morton thinks concretely about what we do with “shit” culturally, he rather unfortunately
neglects the advantages of relatively stable intestinal walls, thanks to which, in fact, we are
able to produce the shit that he so adamantly explores.9 Intestines are a find example of
specific porosity, by which I mean a partial and temporary yet distinct boundary whose
openness and steadfast integrity together maintain our existence—however briefly.
Morton indicates his general rejection of boundaries with his derogatory use of the
term “boxes,” a fact with particular relevance for this discussion of “nature in a box.”
Achieving “the ecological thought” requires, he claims, that we think openness and thus
cease to put things in boxes such as the “anything but human” box or the “Gaia box,” the
“web of life” box, or the “more than human” box (Morton 76). While throwing out all the
boxes and boundaries, even for bodies, he nevertheless maintains the apparently singular
“mind” that can be “closed.” Our bodies are “radically open,” but apparently we can still
have closed minds. Ecological thinking, he writes, “serves as an operating system for
politics: it doesn’t tell you what to do, exactly, but it opens your mind so that you can think
clearly about what to do” (Morton 125, emphasis mine). Human beings have closed minds
9

Morton repeatedly addresses the need to know where our shit goes, in response to Lacan. He makes a good point,
but the thing about excrement is that it is just part of a larger system of food (agriculture, transportation, markets,
cooking) and our bodies that consume, digest, and slowly move it through the intestine. See 32.
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that can be opened with or to “the ecological thought.” Morton’s ecological thought, in fact,
explodes bodily, environmental bounds and yet “reserves a special place for the ‘subject’—
the mind, the person, even the soul” (Morton 113). I note here in contrast the well-known
fact that our minds are already radically open to other minds and cultural practices via
language and ideas, whether we like it or not, as postmodernism has so definitely indicated
and recent studies in brain science demonstrate.10 Alaimo also documents in Bodily Natures
how our minds are materially open in their physical and cognitive responses to caffeine,
drugs, medicines, and various chemicals, or pollutants, as well. Minds are not so much open
in the seemingly rational manner that Morton implies as something that we can
intentionally direct; they are instead emergences from open processes of exchange with
linguistic, cultural, and, equally significant, physical environments. While our bodies and
intestines are, in some ways, more closed than Morton asserts with his call for “radical
openness,” our minds might well be even more open as fluid subjectivities.
Goethe certainly outdoes Morton in regard to exploded subjectivities. Whereas
Morton just speaks of “opening one’s mind,” Goethe takes that notion all the way to its
endpoint. Not only does Werther shoot open his skull so that his brain emerges, freely, into
the world, but his Werther’s subjectivity is precariously open to influences from others,
nature, and texts. Additionally, his manner of thinking in turn, also flows into those around
him. He enacts, I would say, Morton’s “radical openness.” Yet that is not all—his subjectivity
flows even “beyond the text” in that large numbers of young men and some women copied
Werther around Europe, adopting his clothing style, his manner of speaking and thinking,
and some even his choice of suicide, so much so that Goethe spent the rest of his life trying
to say, as he does in the preface to the second edition of Werther to “be a man and do not
follow me.” Werther lives an activist’s dangerous dream: subjectivities are contagious and
can unexpectedly cross texts and bodies, but often not as one hopes.
Morton claims that the ecological thought “forces us to invent ways of being
together that don’t depend on self-interest” (Morton 135). This inspiring assertion
deserves additional thought. Self-interest can also simultaneously be interest-for-others
and environments at the same time, since one really cannot think one human being without

10

See especially Damasio regarding the brain.
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a physical connections and entanglements with others, the environments, and the cultural
frameworks in which the “self” is enmeshed. In this way, we might rethink not “selfinterest,” but rather what exactly we mean by “self.” Perhaps “self-interest,” as it might be
ecologically defined, is a good thing, at least if we understand the self as a nexus of mesh.
Morton concludes the book with the statement that “In the future, we will all be thinking
the ecological thought. It’s irresistible, like true love” (Morton 135). Perhaps the fact that
this sounds more like boundless enthusiasm for a Borg-like unity of all thinking one
thought—resistance is futile—did not occur to Morton. Ecologically speaking, diversity has
advantages, and one might also advocate for diverse “thought.”Also, while ideas are
definitely contagious, we cannot easily predict what “all” will be thinking, nor if it will be
particularly ecological. It may not be, since ecological thinking requires a multi-pronged
perspective, one able, for example, to think open and closed boundaries together, able to
think the large and small scales of global and local together, and to think about today as
part of much longer spans of time as well.
Grappling with the issue of the boundaries and boxes which Morton and Werther
reject with such animosity may be better formulated in terms of varying scales of time and
space, and the general concept of unbalanced nature. In the long-term, geological timescale,
all boundaries are, indeed, erased. Life forms and species exist as bounded, short-term
delineations perpetuating themselves. For human communities, the local is no longer so
local, as Heise demonstrates, rather it, too, is imbricated in much larger international
weather, economic, and agricultural systems so that ecological thinking must also be a
global view today. However, our environmental foundation also needs to relate to the
smaller, humanly-conceivable scope of regional ecosystems in order to inspire action and
to avoid being overwhelmed by the vast interconnectivity of everything, as Patrick Murphy
contends. Kate Rigby’s discussions of boundaries in terms of regional and national
addresses such a spatial issue. She describes the changing boundaries in England and other
areas in Europe in the 19th century when countryside commons and meandering paths
were eradicated and replaced by larger, modern agricultural divisions and road. This both
closed the local walkways between villages, isolating them from each other, and yet opened
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the small villages to the national capital at the same time.11 Rigby thus highlights the
complexity of boundaries, opening and closing them both. Morton, in contrast, takes a more
unitary approach, stressing the benefits of erasing all boundaries, like a good
postmodernist (and, like a good capitalist seeking the “open markets” of globalization,
though he strongly advocates against many other aspects of capitalism), but he neglects the
possibility that one might need some bounds on occasion. Morton and Werther provide the
first step into an appreciation of nature, a savoring of the radical idea of our immersion in
the endless flows and exchanges; but Goethe also takes the next step by providing his
readers with Oronaro who enacts this dream even as his actions clearly reveal the
problematic one-sidedness of a vision dominated either by boxes or intensified ruptures.
Reading Werther and Triumph together keeps us appropriately off-balance and aware of
our boundaries. Indeed, this is just what we need in ecocritical discussions of boundaries:
the tension merging from the juxtaposition of radical openness , boxes, and unbalanced
nature.
Juxtaposing Goethe’s seriously sentimental Werther with his satirical Triumph of
Sentimentality maintains both a requisite lack of balance and the ironic aesthetics’ multipronged perspective. It also offers insights into the messiness of subjectivities that are less
directional than Morton’s The Ecological Thought. In 1777, just three years after the first
publication of Werther, Goethe satirized his own international best-seller. Triumph is
known as a play delineating art and artifice from nature,12 but like Werther it is also about
the individual’s fate and possibility of self-determination in the face of restrictive cultural
and natural forces. Both texts also present an unstable character dealing with unbalanced
nature and the terrible unbalancing of love. In this case, it is a marital crisis. King Andrason
is displeased that his wife is smitten with Prince Oronaro whose sentimental revelry and
monodramas are infectious. The king asks his sister’s maids to seduce Oronaro so that he
can have his wife back. This effort fails since the Prince actually loves not the queen but
rather a life-size doll resembling her, a doll stuffed full of sentimental literature, including
Werther and some Rousseau. Additionally, Oronaro loves nature, like Werther, but finds it
too hot or cold, too damp or too dry, filled with bugs and rain and dirt, and even air, and so
11
12

See Rigby, especially 66-70.
See especially John P. Heins for a discussion of the aesthetic delineations.
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he has nature constructed in his castle where he can revel in its aesthetic beauties without
placing himself at risk. As his servant, Merkulo, describes it, Oronaro loves nothing more
than nature, yet his very sensitivity makes him too sensitive:
My prince has such delicate, extremely sensitive nerves, that he must really protect himself from the
air and the rapid changes during the day. Clearly, one cannot always have things under the open sky
quite so temperate as one wishes. The dampness of the morning and evening dew is considered to be
extremely damaging by the doctors, and the scent of moss underneath springs on warm summer
days is thought to be no less dangerous!13

Of course, unlike Werther, Oronaro loathes the insects, ants, and spiders. Furthermore, not
to be without his “nature” when travelling, the prince has had the greatest masters build
boxes to contain bubbling springs, bird song, and moonlight that can be assembled on site.
These are unpacked to create an indoor grotto with all the amenities of nature, except for
the cool breezes which they have not yet been boxed, though the French scientists are
working on it.14 Goethe thus unbalances our expectations: “nature” becomes interior
decoration, and the cultural artifice of sentimentality becomes a “force of nature.”
Furthermore, the crux of the play relates to the efforts to decipher the two oracular
messages, the one to the King and the other to the prince regarding their loves; both
messages are oddly precise and concrete even though they seem utterly mysterious at first.
In other words, the “spiritual” wisdom becomes mundane and material, and the mundane
material, or even mechanical, becomes aesthetically spiritual.
All seems well in the sixth and final act of Goethe’s play, (five acts were not enough
for resolution): the king and queen are reunited, as is the prince with his doll. Oronaro
maintains his love for artificial, interior nature and the artificial girl; the queen sees the
folly of sentimentality; and nature remains safely boxable. This suggests a reversal of
Werther’s reality; for Werther, nature explodes all bounds and he seeks to join it. Yet even
as both texts play with our misconceptions of nature, they share one view on the problem
13

“Mein Prinz ist von so zärtlichen, äußerst empfindsamen Nerven, daß er sich gar sehr vor der Luft, und vor
schnellen Abwechselungen der Tagezeiten hüten muß. Freilich unter freiem Himmel kann man’s nicht immer so
temperiert haben, wie man wünscht. Die Feuchtigkeit des Morgen- und Abendtaues halten die Leibärzte für höchst
schädlich, den Duft des Mooses unter den Quellen bei heißen Sommertagen für nicht minder gefährlich!” (82,
translation mine).
14
The Prince travels with many “Kasten,” containing “nature.” “Merkulo: ‘Hier führen wir die vorzüglichsten
Glückseligkeiten empfindsamer Seelen bei uns. In diesem Kasten sind sprudelnde Quellen.’ Mana: ‘Oh!’ Merkulo:
‘Hier in diesem ist der Gesang, der lieblichste Gesang der Vögel verborgen.’ Mana: ‘Warum nicht gar?’ Merkulo:
‘Und hier in diesem größern ist Mondschein eingepackt’” (Goethe, Triumph 84).

14

of agency and contagious subjectivities. In the Triumph, the king warns the girls who pull
the sentimental books out of the doll not to take even a single glance lest their allure
overcome them. Indeed, the danger of sentimentality still lurks even at the seemingly
happy end: both the queen and Oronaro repeat their final lines twice, as if they had not
recovered from sentimentality but rather have themselves become puppets of love. The
danger in Goethe’s Triumph of Sentimentality, in other words, is that sentimentality will
indeed triumph, particularly when we think we have overcome it. Putting nature in a box,
as the prince does, fails since nature tends to escape containment eventually. Yet the
metaphor of boxes is quite relevant. While Morton sees us successfully opening our minds
and thinking our way out of these messes by eliminating boxes, Goethe sees subjectivity
and nature’s flows as being directed by many forces including gravity and currents, but also
cultural trends and fashions utterly out of the control of even their authors. That is, readers
and interpretations of Werther became a force that Goethe could not deter for the rest of
his life despite all of his best efforts. Subjectivity’s contagion can blaze unexpected and
uncontrollable paths. Efforts to resist it or direct its course, are often, to cite the Borg yet
again, futile. Both Werther and Triumph deploy human agency and natural flux as related,
unruly flows. We human beings have enormous influence on these flows, but rarely with
the outcomes we intend and imagine. By juxtaposing the exploding boundaries of Werther
with the closed boxes of Triumph, Goethe shifts the flows of agency. The traditionally
assumed course moving from human subject to the world becomes instead multidirectional flows amongst nature, culture, individuals. Goethe describes an entanglement of
minds, bodies, texts, and world not so unlike Barad’s entanglement of “matter and meaning.”
I conclude with three core ideas for ecocriticism in terms of boundaries and boxes.
First, by juxtaposing Goethe’s Werther with his Triumph of Sentimentality, we better
understand Goethe as being more than a sentimental nature poet. He was the author of
complex polarities such as both the sentimental and the “ironic Werther.” When armed
with this irony, one can see Werther’s inclination to become an insect and have a bug-eye’s
view as emblematic for modern entanglements with nature that cannot be expressed as a
singular perspective. Goethe’s two texts contest in differing ways our boundaries, so that
an active polarity emerges which we most productively read with the multi-pronged
perspective of ironic aesthetics. Second, it is highly relevant for ecocriticism to assess the
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material boundaries of bodies in terms of local and global ecosystems, the political and
ideological contestation of all such borders, and also their contagious subjectivities. We
follow Morton’s plea to acknowledge how bodies, ecologies, and subjects are radically open,
but we should also embrace and maintain the health and stability of our porous yet
enclosed intestines, upon which we depend during our lifetime. Third, understanding
unbalanced nature means seeing how all boundaries fade in the long-term, cosmic view;
yet short-term boundaries allow a steady-state existence far from equilibrium, in other
words, they allow, with some significance, biological life to exist. Straddling these two sides
of porous boundaries and stable boundaries allows another polarity to emerge, this one
also embracing the human body as part of unbalanced nature broadly (rather than in
opposition to it). To think the juxtaposition is to contend meaningfully with the manifold
arguments regarding our bodily, environmental, and subjective bounds.
While Goethe doesn’t provide us with simple solutions to our current ecological
crises, he at least saw clearly the challenges of delineating and re-thinking boundaries. And
he was not so hasty to throw away the boxes. The ironic image of boxes reminds us of the
impermanence of our precariously flimsy and yet necessary boundaries that contain our
internal organs and allow stable maintenance of temperature, pH, etc. Erasing these limits
can be dangerous, as Werther reveals, but believing in them whole-heartedly as fully
enclosed boxes is also limiting, if not ludicrous, as Oronaro demonstrates. On a broader
international scope, the elimination of boundaries overlooks the obligation to maintain
some cultural, physical, and economic limits in the face of “opening” global markets as if
that were entirely about freedom instead of imposing specific cultural paradigms. I thus
propose boxes as a metaphor for the maintenance of material bodies and their habitats, or
“nature”: porous boxes, open boxes, but boxes nevertheless, boxes that suggest the
necessity of bounds to humanity’s hubris of believing that we construct at whim the very
material and cultural bodies, subjectivities, and spaces we inhabit.
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